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Abstract
This study characterizes ecological distribution conflicts (EDC) related to the mining industry and 
derives a series of political implications for Guatemala.  The characterization includes a placement 
in the context of Central America, regional location, intensity of the EDC and the trends in social 
and environmental consequences, with special emphasis on the groups of social actors affected 
and the degree to which the institutional framework does not provide effective means of 
participatory environmental governance. The time period covers 2005 to 2013. In order to 
understand trends in actor behavior and diverse moments of high intensity we introduce the use 
of action and response timelines as a methodology for EDC analysis. We propose the notions of 
embedded conflicts to describe their relation with the structural social conditions prevailing in the 
country and swarms of conflicts to describe their escalation through time. We conclude that 
conflictivity is inherent to the unsustainable characteristics of metallic mining and is aggravated by 
Guatemala´s history of social inequality and power concentration. The attempts to reduce 
“conflictivity” through CSR have been insufficient in addressing these structural conditions. EDCs 
may have helped create a positive environment for creative forces to seek sustainability and 
justice in Guatemala´s development model.
Keywords:
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1. Introduction
In the present study, we present some of the results of research carried on for the United Nations 
Development Program in Guatemala focused on a characterization of the ecological distribution 
conflicts (EDC) generated by the mining industry between 2005 and 2013.   For this, we 
characterized the Guatemalan conflict situation within the Central American context. Next, we 
specifically sought to identify and locate regionally the main mining projects (exploration and 
exploitation licenses) and their related EDCs. We also sought to identify the main social and 
ecological consequences of these conflicts with special emphasis on their patterns of intensity. In 
order to understand the social dynamics of the activity, we characterized the main actors and the 
evolution of their interests and the consequences on them (Aguilar González, 2013). 
We also analyzed critically the role of the national and local institutional framework in addressing 
this conflictivity. We wish to determine if the role of the State has been active or deficient as an 
institutional mediator leading to conflictivity by action or omission. The analysis synthetizes the 
legal and institutional framework and characterizes its contributions to the 
development/resolution of mining conflicts. (Barriga, et al., 2007; Paniagua, 2007; Brenner, 2010). 
We also evaluate, albeit more succinctly, the effectiveness of the actions taken by extractive 
companies through corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs.
We use a Political Ecology theoretical framework focused on the study of EDC that are caused by 
an increase in the social metabolism1 (an increase in the extraction of energy and materials) 
generated by the neo-extractivist model of development implemented in the last 2 decades 
(Martínez-Alier, 2004; Svampa, 2013).  We understand mining related EDCs being the result of an 
unfair the distribution to/by social actors of the costs and benefits of the use/appropriation of 
environmental space. (Martínez-Alier, 2004; Walter, 2009). The concept of environmental space 
introduces in the measurement of equality, beyond the distribution of incomes and economic 
rewards, the recognition of the human right to the enjoyment of benefits from environmental 
services that are provided by ecosystem functions. These services and the ecosystems where they 
come from constitute the common heritage that is denominated environmental space (Hille, 
1997). 
In this sense, the focus of our analysis sought to provide evidence on the asymmetries of power 
that lead to the unjust distribution of the environmental space related to the mining activity. 
These asymmetries result in environmental injustice (Martínez-Alier, 2008). 
This type of spatial/equity documentation fits the line of research on EDC that has been led by the 
Autonomous University of Barcelona through the Environmental Justice Atlas (EJAtlas – 
1 The concept of social metabolism refers to the set of flows of materials and energy that occur between 
Nature and society, and between different societies, carried out with a specific cultural form (Toledo, 2013).
http://ejatlas.org) and its related research projects. Environmental activist organizations like 
OCMAL (Observatory for Mining Conflicts in Latin America), alongside academic researchers like 
the EJOLT project (www.ejolt.org) and other research projects have produced free access 
inventories and conflict maps around the world which seek to highlight these asymmetries and 
articulate Environmental Justice movements worldwide. 
2. Qualitative and Quantitative Methods
A mixed qualitative and quantitative methodology was used for the comprehension of the 
Guatemalan socio-ecological context, as well as for gathering and analyzing information on the 
EDCs related to mining activities between 2005 and 2013. It included literature review, data 
collection and analysis through descriptive statistical tools. 
The literature reviewed included research on case studies at a local level, national studies on 
mining conflicts, environmental diagnostics, reports on the situation of human rights of indigenous 
groups, publications from business associations, news sources and the websites of several 
organizations. Through the help of the UNDP, we had access to the Ministry of Energy and 
Mining´s (MEM) database and maps of exploration and exploitation licenses (October 2013). They 
were complemented by the available online databases of active mining rights per department in 
(December 2014). This allowed disaggregation and descriptive statistical analysis by mining types. 
To build a preliminary list of the most important conflicts and evaluate their intensity, an online 
survey of key informants was carried out, using a snowball sampling approach. We delivered an 
instrument designed to compile and characterize a list of conflicts in accordance to the levels of 
intensity defined in our theoretical framework. The instrument was delivered to 16 actors and key 
experts. 
We evaluated the intensity of the conflicts using an adaption of the scale used by the EJAtlas. The 
Atlas includes as parameters the spatial and visibility level of mobilization and organization of 
actors mobilizing and the level of violence.  Our scale seeks to enrich this approach gauging the 
level of organization and complexity of all actors, the spatial scale of the conflict itself (as 
compared to the national/regional socio-ecological context where it is happening), the level of 
tension and social violence and the scale and visibility of mobilization (Aguilar-González, et al., 
2015).  
This scale is consequent with the logic of other scales of conflictivity. In relation to the scale of 
political conflicts of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK), our scale fits 
within the realm of what their technical studies consider low and medium intensity conflicts. The 
scales of high intensity in this metric refers to those conflicts that result in war (Heidelberg 
Institute for International Conflict Research, 2015). 
We also adopt a conflict evolution model of seven functional stages, going from the formation or 
latency of conflict to crisis, through stages of emergence and escalation. Once the crisis has 
finished, it recognizes the steps of de-escalation, maturity, and transformation (Bedoya, et al., 
2010).
Fieldwork was carried out in Guatemala in March 2015 with eight meetings and semi-structured 
interviews with key actors and experts from environmental organizations, indigenous/human 
rights groups, research centers, unions, mining companies, government entities and academic 
centers. Our academic and technical informants included Raúl Maas and Lourdes Molina, 
researchers from the Instituto de Agricultura, Recursos Naturales of the Raúl Landivar University 
(IARNA-URL) and the Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales (ICEFI). These interviews 
helped us complement our literature review regarding the technical aspects of the social, 
economic and environmental consequences of the mining activity in Guatemala and the interests, 
views and actions of diverse social actors.
From the mining industry sector we had interviews with Mario Marroquín, Executive Director of 
Goldcorp (Montana Exploradora) and Mario Orellana, president of the Chamber of Extractive 
Industries (GREMIEXT). We also met with Guillermo Monroy, Laura Retolaza and José Zepeda, 
representatives of Minera San Rafael. We sought to assess their perspective on similar issues as 
those described above and to gain a more immediate sense of the industry´s CSR programs.
We enriched our assessment on actor’s perspectives, consequences of the activity and the 
institutional preparedness of Guatemala to address the conflicts generated by the activity through 
two sources. We met with representatives of the Dialogue and Citizen Participation Unit of the 
Vice-ministry of Sustainable Development, Mayra Quiñonez, Otto Reyes, Sandy Polando and Julio 
César Chacón. We also attended an International Seminar on Transparency and Extractive 
Industries organized by local NGOs with international support from Transparency International. 
Finally we were able to meet with two representatives from the NGO and community activist 
sector: Yolanda Oquelí from the community of La Puya and Magali Rey Rosa from the Savia School 
of Ecologist Thought. We gathered from them a first-hand notion of the perspective of these 
organized groups which resist mining activities. 
We used discourse analysis (Sayago, 2014) to identify individual and group interests from actors as 
well as the power relations that characterize them. The information gathered through the 
literature survey, key informant survey and fieldwork was complemented by technical 
consultation with EJAtlas and OCMAL team members. The final ranking of conflicts was done using 
the group “brainstorming” method (Osborn, 1963). 
We located the conflicts geographically based on licensing map created by previous research 
(ICEFI, 2014). Information was compiled for each selected conflict, through a summarized form 
based on the EJAtlas data form. For selected conflicts, graphics of action and response by actors 
through time were elaborated in order to understand the evolution of the complexity and 
intensity of the conflicts as done elsewhere in Central America for the landmark Crucitas mining 
conflict (Aguilar González, et al., 2012). 
3. Results and Discussion
In order to frame the presentation of results we briefly present the socio-historical context of 
mining EDCs in Guatemala. We follow with a description of the geographic and temporal trends 
found in the appropriation of environmental space by mining projects. We close with a focus on 
the institutional framework relative to our results.
3.1 The Central American Context of Mining Conflictivy
The EJAtlas documents EDC (Temper, et al., 2015a; Temper, et al., 2015b). Since 2014 the 
documentation of these conflicts accelerated in Central America through the work of diverse 
organizations academic and on the ground contributors (Temper, et al., 2015a; Temper, et al., 
2015b). 
This documentation has allowed a statistical political ecology analysis in collaboration between the 
Universidad del Valle from Cali, Colombia, the University of Barcelona´s ICTA institute and 
Fundación Neotrópica under the umbrella of the MESOCA-ANCA project. Of all Central American 
conflicts documented up to 2015 (Figure 1), the majority are registered in Guatemala with 27.5% 
of the 80 conflicts included until then, followed by Panama (18.8%) and Honduras (17.5%) (Navas, 
2016).
Figure 2 shows us the registry of 80 conflicts up until 2015 in Central America. From these, 29% 
were conflicts related to mining activities (more than a third of them appear in Guatemala). 
Conflicts related to water management are 24% of the total. These include conflicts related to 
hydroelectric projects. Those categories that relate to the appropriation of biomass and physical 
space, mostly by plantation activities and for biodiversity conservation are 25% of the total. 
Conflicts that relate to tourism are 9% of the total, mostly concentrated in Costa Rica. Fossil fuel 
energy shows a 9% of all conflicts while the record also shows conflicts from logistical 
infrastructure development (related to the Panama Canal and to projects such as Nicaragua´s 
Grand Canal) and real estate development (5%) (Navas, 2016). 
These results confirm the conclusions of several studies which have already developed accounts 
for the region of the social and environmental impacts of neo-extractivism in terms of industries 
such as mining (Aguilar, et al., 2015; Alemancia, et al., 2015). Several other trends that 
characterize this conflictivity are worth presenting for the purposes of these results. These were 
part of the conclusions of the II Latin American Conference on Environmental Conflicts (COLCA).
EDC in Central America have been increasing in numbers in the last decades, coinciding with the 
increase in neo-extractive activities. Figure 3 shows us this trend as of the EDC beginning each year 

























































Figure 1- Ecological Distribution Conflicts by country in Central America according to the 
EJAtlas. Source: Navas (2016) for the MESOCA-ANCA Project.
Figure 2- Percentage of EDC in Central America by Metabolic Sector. Source: Navas (2016) 
for the MESOCA-ANCA Project.






















































































Figure 3- EDC beginning per Year in Central America According to the EJAtlas. Source: 
Authors based on EJAtlas (https://ejatlas.org/).
In Table 1, we can see that the metabolic sectors with the highest increase after 2002 are mining 
and water management. Water management conflicts also includes hydroelectric power 
generation aside water rights and sanitation disputes.  The configuration of economic structures 
related to neo-extractivism demanding more raw materials and energy would seem a logical 
generator here. Biomass and land acquisition conflicts maintain a more or less constant rate since 
1991 (slightly larger in the 1991-2001 decade). Since they include agriculture and cattle, they seem 
like the result of traditional extractivist activities too. Yet here one needs to take into account the 
role of “new” agricultural activities which have been expanded since the end of the last century 
(i.e. pineapples and African palm). Tourism recreation conflicts appear in the 1990s and increase in 
the new century. Similarly, infrastructure conflicts are a phenomenon of this century. The conflicts 
associated with these two last sectors are more correlated with the current development models 
of Costa Rica and Panama, more focused in the service sector.
Table 1- EDC per Beginning Year and Metabolic Sector in Central America According to the 
EJAtlas. Source: Navas (2016) for the MESOCA-ANCA Project.
 Number of Conflicts 












Biomass and Land 
Acquisition 3 6 4 3 1 17
Biodiversity Conservation 2 1 3
Fossil Fuel Energy 2 2 2 6
Water Management 2 1 10 6 19
Industry 1 1
Infrastructure 1 2 3
Waste Management 1 1
Mining 2 4 12 5 23
Tourism 2 4 1 7
 General Total 11 16 31 21 1 80
The intensity of the conflicts registered for each metabolic sector shows us that the conflicts related 
to biomass/land acquisition and mining are predominantly high in intensity (according to the EJAtlas 
scale). Of the three prevailing, water management conflicts have a high percentage in this category 
too, yet more are in the middle intensity range. Interestingly, the three conflicts of biodiversity 
conservation registered are all of high intensity (Table 2). Being these categories all related to 
territorial control may be an explanation for this trend in a region known for land tenure insecurity 
and lack of recognition of indigenous land rights. This high intensity has frequently resulted human 
life loss. 
This sad fact is illustrated by the revelations of Global Witness in its 2016 report “In Dangerous 
Ground”, dedicated to the deceased Honduran environmental activist Berta Cáceres. The report 
assures that 2015 was the year with the largest amount of deaths of environmental defenders 
throughout the world in record: a total 185. Latin America registered 66% of these deaths: Brasil 
50), Colombia (26), Perú (12), Nicaragua (12), Guatemala (10), Honduras (8) and México (4) for a 
total of 122 (Global Witness, 2016). 
Unfortunately the effects of EDCs are not evenly distributed in the region as, according to the figures 
synthesized from the EJAtlas, the main groups affected are Indigenous and peasant communities 
living in rural areas (Figure 4). These areas also have the lowest levels of social development in 
Central America as elsewhere in the world (Aguilar-González, 2016).
Intesity of ConflictsMetabolic Sector
Low Medium High Unknown
Total
Biomass and Land 
Acquisition
2 6 9  17
Biodiversity Conservation   3  3
Fossil Energy /CJ 2 2 1 1 6
Water Management  10 9  19
Industry  1   1
Infrastructure  3   3
Waste Management  1   1
Mining 1 9 13  23
Tourism 3 3 1  7
General Total 8 35 36 1 80
Figure 4- Groups Affected by EDC in Central America. Source: Adapted from Navas (2016) from 
MESOCA-ANCA Project.
The EJAtlas also shows us a trend which is basic to understand the diverse roles that the State 
plays in Central America. Costa Rica and El Salvador show the highest rates of what the Atlas calls 
environmental justice successes. These are cases where projects have been stopped from 
happening. In these countries courts have declared mining projects illegal and both have banned 
open pit mining largely due to the action of civil society organizations. A combination of regulation 
enforcement by courts and civil society actions have shown the potential role that conflicts can 
play in leading legal reforms that may alter structural conditions that have facilitated the 
development of extractive activities in Central America (Alemancia, et al., 2015). We will evaluate 
these trends next in view of the Guatemalan experience.
Table 2- Environmental Justice Successes as of 2015 Relative to Number of Conflicts 
According to the EJAtlas. Source: Navas (2016) for MESOCA-ANCA Project
Country Number of EJ 
Successes
Number of Conflicts Rate of Success
Guatemala 6 22 27%
Belice 1 3 33%
Honduras 1 152 7%
El Salvador 3 72 43%
Nicaragua 1 92 11%
Costa Rica 7 11 64%
Panamá 1 15 7%
 
3.2 The Socio-Historical Evolution of Mining in Guatemala and the Emergence of Nested 
Ecological Distribution Conflicts.
Guatemala has one of the highest inequality levels in Latin America and the Caribbean. Its Gini 
index for income inequality is reported to be 0.531 in 2015, indicating a relatively high level of 
disparity between those sectors with the highest and lower levels of income in the nation3 (UNDP, 
2 The registry includes a conflict in the Gulf of Fonseca which is shared by Honduras, El Salvador and 
Nicaragua.
3 The Gini Index is a measure of statistical dispersion which ranges from 0 to 1 and is used for measuring the 
disparity in indicators such as land ownership, income, wealth and others. A measure of 0 indicates perfect 
equality, whereas a measure of 1 maximal inequality.  Levels of 0.6 or above indicate an extremely high level 
of inequality. Currently, according to the World Bank, only four countries surpass this benchmark: South 
Africa, Namibia, Haiti and Bostwana. Guatemala ranks as the 17th most unequal country in the World Bank 
database according to the last year reported of the Gini Index for income. The data can be accessed at 
http://api.worldbank.org/v2/en/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?downloadformat=xml.
2016). According to the Latinobarómetro Report of 2011, Guatemala is the country with the 
highest perception of discrimination in Latin America. More than half of Guatemalans (51%) 
believe that they are discriminated based on race (Corporación Latinobarómetro, 2011). The abuse 
against human rights, the fragility of the social fabric, the heritage of more than thirty years of 
armed conflict, acts of genocide and the irresolute situation of land ownership between the State, 
rural and indigenous territories, and the private sector all combine too to create an environment 
that is prone to the development of conflicts in different realms (IRALEP, 2010; Maas, et al., 2014; 
UNDP, 2016). These factors have been enhanced by the pressure exercised by extractive activities 
promoted as part of the model of development by Guatemalan governments now for many 
decades. A marked mistrust towards public institutions has its roots in this conflictive landscape 
(Maas, et al., 2014). 
Therefore, several studies concur today that the conflictivity in mining activities is framed within 
the wider context of social protest, inequity, mistrust of the State and of opposing visions of 
development for the country and for its communities (Castagnino, 2006; van de Sandt, 2009; 
Araya, et al., 2010; IRALEP, 2010; IARNA-URL, 2012; Waxenecker, 2013; ICEFI, 2014; Aldana & 
Abate, 2016; Shipton, 2017). Guatemalan mining has evolved historically in parallel to the 
transformation of its social metabolism and the unfair appropriation of environmental space by 
the Spanish, ladino oligarchies, and later by transnational-local economic groups which 
concentrate power and wealth. 
It started in colonial times, with the exploitation of silver, gold and lead (Waxenecker, 2013). With 
the independence in 1821, mining activity decreased due the instability generated by the clashes 
within independence movements. In 1871, with the Liberal Reform, mining in Guatemala began to 
depend on the price of metals in the international market. Yet, it was not until halfway through 
the 20th century when the extraction of metals (especially gold and silver) caused an acceleration 
of the social metabolism. After the coup of 1954, the systematic adoption of policies for mining 
extraction (such as a Law of Quarries, two laws for the promotion of small mining and two mining 
laws) signals a special emphasis on the tendency of the Guatemalan State to promote the interests 
of mining companies (Solano, 2005; Castagnino, 2006; UNDP, 2016).
In this context, the case of the EXMIBAL project (Fénix-El Estor) is emblematic of the overlap in 
interests between transnational companies and the political and economic elites of the country. 
After the approval of the new Code of Mining Extraction of 1965, INCO (International Nickel 
Company from Canada) was awarded 410 square kilometers of concessions in the departments of 
Alta Verapaz and Izabal for a period of 40 years, making this company one of the biggest 
landowners of the regions (which already had serious land tenure and indigenous rights 
recognition issues). The rejection of mining activities became an opposition to the general social 
situation in the country and the power of those who controlled it. The repression against the 
opposition of mining projects mixed with the repression against insurgent groups. This repression 
included the Massacre of Panzós in 1978 and generated significant international and national 
protests (Grandin, 2004; Castagnino, 2006; Nolin & Stephens, 2010; UNDP, 2016). 
Guatemala started then showing examples of nested ecological distribution conflicts in the mining 
sector. A nested ecological distribution conflict (NEDC) is an EDC that cannot be understood in an 
isolated manner as it is deeply nested in the background of inequality and violence of the studied 
reality. The recognition of this substrate requires the understanding of the interaction and 
superposition between the general social conflictivity and the EDC. This interrelation between the 
scales of conflictivity generates higher complexity with regarding the identification of the actors 
and the interests that are manifested in the conflicts. Additionally, the multiplicity of actors and of 
spaces of conflictivity increases the potential of the emerging complexity, making the outcomes of 
the EDC more unpredictable and the potential socio-ecological costs higher (Aguilar-González, et 
al., 2015; UNDP, 2016).
In 1982 INCO decided to close their activities, in part because of the increase in gas prices and the 
decrease in the price of nickel in international markets. Some analysts think that other motives 
were behind this decision (Solano, 2005; UNDP, 2016).
After the signing of the Peace Accords in 1996, globalization and free market proposals, with an 
increase in transnational private investment become the dominant political trend in Guatemala. 
The granting of mining licenses, particularly for metals, is increased during the Arzú and Berger 
governments, as we will also show later in the results (UNDP, 2016). 
The process of “liberalization” is accentuated by the signing of free trade agreements between 
Central America and the Dominican Republic with the United States (DR-CAFTA) in 2004. A 
significant surge in mining activities is favored by the increased focus on export products, the 
rising of the price of minerals in international markets, as well as innovative technology that 
allowed an expansion of mining activities with higher profitability (IARNA-URL, 2012; UNDP, 2016). 
The above mentioned increase in mining licenses brings a novel reaction that marks the main 
trend in opposition in the last decades (UNDP, 2016). In 2003 an exploitation license for gold, 
silver, zinc, lead, iron, copper and mercury was granted to the transnational Glamis Gold Ltd in the 
department of San Marcos as “Proyecto Mina Marlin”. Glamis Gold is the owner of the 
Guatemalan subsidirary Montana Exploradora Guatemalteca S.A. The inhabitants of Sipakapa and 
San Miguel de Ixtahuacan (largely Maya-Quiche, Sipakapense and Maya Mam) and environmental 
organizations manifested their rejection to the mine. They were concerned about the 
environmental impact, the lack of popular participation from the communities that surround the 
project and the violation of indigenous territories of collective property already protected by 
international legislation. In the spirit of International Labor Organization´s Convention 169 (ratified 
by Guatemala in 1996), on June 18th, 2005, the first self-organized community consultation about 
the acceptance or rejection of the mining project in their lands takes place in Sipakapa. Thirteen 
communities participated. The results were 2,448 votes against the mine, 35 in favor, 8 null, and 1 
left blank (van de Sandt, 2009; Yagenova & García, 2009; Laplante & Nolin, 2014).  
The beginning of operation of the Marlin Mine in 2005, marks another fundamental change in the 
scale of production of metallic mining in Guatemala. The mine evolves to produce 96% in all 
mining sales in the country between 2005 and 2011 (IARNA-URL, 2012; UNDP, 2016). The 
operation of this project also generated an increase in the intensity and radicalization of the 
opposition by indigenous communities and civil society organizations to mining projects in 
Guatemala (Yagenova & García, 2009; Nolin & Stephens, 2010; Laplante & Nolin, 2014). 
During the specific period studied (2005-2013), the mining sector had a continuous productive 
expansion. The added value of this economic activity was reported in 2011 to be more than triple 
its original value in 2006 (ICEFI, 2014). 
3.3 Geographic and Temporal Trends in the Appropriation of Environmental Space by Mining 
Projects (2005-2013) in Guatemala.
  
Figure 5, resulting from the analysis of the MEM database ratifies the trends above stated for the 
2005-2013 period under scrutiny as Berger (2004-2008) and Perez Molina (2012-2015), to a lesser 
extent, maintained the trend of the Arzu (1998-2002) period of granting many licenses for 











































































Figure 5-Exploration and Exploitation Mining Licenses 1985-2013. Source: Modified from 
Aguilar-González et al. (2015).
During the Alvaro Colom administration (2008-2012) the granting of licenses remained under a 
technical moratorium brought about by a resolution from the constitutional court to a claim 
presented by the NGO CALAS4 (UNDP, 2016). Of the exploration licenses given in the examined 
period the majority were for metallic mining. The majority of exploitation licenses were for non-
metallic mining or for construction materials.
Regarding geographical distribution, we obtained results for all types of mining jointly and 
differentiated (by mining types and exploitation and exploration rights). This distribution is related 
to the level of EDCs, as not all types of mining have generated the same levels of conflicts. It is the 
metallic mining sector that has generated highest levels of conflicts (Aguilar-González, et al., 
2015).
In the case of metallic mining, the concentration of concessions of environmental space in active 
licenses (October 2013) was in departments with higher levels of indigenous population (with over 
25%) when it comes to exploration. As Figure 6 shows, the same situation prevails when 
exploitation permits are added.   
4 Centro de Acción Legal Ambiental y Social
Figure 6- Active Licenses (October 2013) for the Exploration and Exploitation of Metallic Mining per Department in Guatemala and 
Percentage of Indigenous Population. Source: Modified from Aguilar-González et al. (2015). Data on indigenous population by 
department is from Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (2012).
3.4 Characterization of Relevant EDCs and Effects of Mining Activity Documented 
Eleven conflicts were identified in this research as relevant examples to characterize conflictivity in 
Guatemala, some of them coinciding with the ones identified by OCMAL´s database.  They 
reported 208 mining conflicts in Latin America in 2015 of which six were located in Guatemala.  
The way in which OCMAL selects conflicts is different. They include a mixture of judicial, direct 
actions and projects.
PNUD later excluded from our database the ones that we classified at a latent stage for its Human 
Development Report, in order to only represent conflicts that have manifested in some form of 
action, even if at low intensity. We adopt this approach in this report in order to be consistent 
with their publication. As can be seen in Table 4, most EDCs identified have reached high intensity. 
The older ones are de-escalating after reaching that level of intensity, while three were reported 
as in crisis at the time of the study.  Eighty percent of these conflicts are in metallic mining.
All conflicts in the escalation stage are of medium intensity and in the metallic mining sector. 
Seventy eight percent of the conflicts began after 2005. Eight of the conflicts are related with 
transnational capital, mostly Canadian.
For a more detailed analysis of each of these conflicts, the description is available in the final 
report to UNDP Guatemala (Aguilar, et al., 2015).  We summarize here some other important 
trends. The conflicts can begin in different phases of a mining project. In some cases (Los Chocoyos 
or Cerro Blanco, amongst others), resistance and actions against mining were carried out in phases 
previous to the start of the activity. In other cases (La Puya, Marlin, Cementos Progreso) 
communities act during the construction or extraction of mineral and there are confrontations on 
site with high indices of violence. 
Martínez-Alier holds that this conflictivity is sparked by a clash of perceptions and interests about 
what is interpreted as development, but, most of all, over the distribution of environmental costs 
and economic benefits of each activity (Martínez-Alier, et al., 2010). The most vulnerable and 
economically impoverished populations (mestizo rural communities, peasants, indigenous 
territories) are the most impacted by the negative effects of mining activities. This resistance 
movement for environmental justice has also been called “Environmentalism of the Poor” 
(Martínez-Alier, 2003).
Table 3- EDCs identified as the Most Relevant for the Mining Sector in Guatemala. Source: 
Modified from Aguilar-González et al. (2015) and PNUD (2016).
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Sky Resources (bought by 
HubBay Resources-Canada)
Solway Investment (Russia) 
























Crisis Cementos Progreso (Guatemala)




















Radius Gold Inc. (Canadá), 
KCA (Kappes, Cassiday and 
Associates) (USA), 





Jade 2012 Low Surging
Unidentified-several 
Chinese capital companies



















Crisis Tahoe Resources Inc (Canada)
Before detailing some of the trends of the economic, social and environmental impacts 
documented, we clarify three particularities on the environmental impacts of mining: 1) they can 
be cumulative (like the contamination of a river with cyanide), 2) sometimes they are only 
identifiable on the long-run (for example, with health issues affecting local populations) and 3) the 
perception of damage may be ambiguous as it may be possible to identify a direct zone of impact 
but difficult to identify a zone impacted indirectly (Aguilar-González, et al., 2015).
Table 5 synthesizes the impacts documented in the study. The following sections detail some 
important features of these impacts. The table presents positive and negative impacts on the 
economic, social and environmental dimensions. It includes an additional category which we call 
polysemic5 as we detected that its perception depends on the position of the diverse actors. The 
following subsections summarize some of the aspects we believe should be highlighted from this 
information.
Table 4 – Summary of Economic, Social and Environmental Impacts Documented in the EDCs 
identified as relevant. Source: Adapted from Aguilar, et al. (2015) 
Economic Social Environmental
Positive Impacts Positive Impacts Positive Impacts
 Direct and indirect 
employment creation
 Export revenue
 Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) 
programs
 Fees and taxes to benefit 
local economy
 Infrastructure
 CSR programs related to 
health, education, etc.
 Reforestation programs
 Investment in recycling 
and environmental 
education programs
Negative Impacts Negative Impacts Negative Impacts
 Land monopolized
 Food insecurity increases 
food costs in project 
regions
 Economic losses to local 
producers whose crops 
are damaged by soil and 
water pollution
 Tax exemptions and 





 Change in traditional roles 







 Increase in criminality, 
drug addiction, alcoholism 
and other social problems
 Destruction of 
archeological legacy
 Human health impacts
 Militarization and increase 
in police presence
 Human rights violations-
criminalization of protest
 Loss of biodiversity
 Deforestation
 Air pollution (particulates)
 Sound pollution 
(machinery)




 Reduction in 
hydrogeological 
connectivity
 Increase in waste 
generation (solid and 
liquid)
5 Polysemic refers to the idea that any text can have multiple meanings rather than a single meaning.
Economic Social Environmental
 Indigenous rights 
violations-Lack of 
community consultations
 Violence against women
Polysemic Impacts Polysemic Impacts Polysemic Impacts
 Land price speculation  Cultural changes  Aesthetic alteration
3.4.1. Economic Impacts 
At a macro level, the overall contribution of the mining and quarries sector to the Guatemalan 
economy is expressed in the contribution to the GDP. ICEFI criticizes this contribution as very low. 
During the period studied it went from 0.61% in 2005 to 0.85% in 2014 (ICEFI, 2014). The main 
economic activities of the country: manufacturing industry and agriculture generate 17% and 13% 
respectively. 
At the local level, the informants in this study representing the industry stated that many positive 
economic, social and environmental impacts come through Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
programs. They include help to schools, investments in infrastructure, etc. Some informants 
criticize these actions as generating dependence on the companies and a privatization of public 
services that should be offered by the State or local governments. These actions are used to justify 
the occupation of environmental space. Additionally, CSR actions are criticized as granting the 
power to foreign companies to disproportionately influence decision-making at the local level and 
to cover up human rights violations (ICEFI, 2014; Laplante & Nolin, 2014; Aguilar-González, et al., 
2015). 
3.4.2. Social Impacts 
Deaths and wounded from the violence in these conflicts are the first and most striking social 
impact. Beyond the distribution of the social, economic or environmental benefits and costs of the 
activity there is a dispute for the appropriation of environmental space. 
This “territory” is conceived by conflicting actors from different perspectives: the indigenous and 
peasant populations defend their collective land titles because they are a space of social 
reproduction, of interaction with the land through agriculture, of defense, of history, of life. For 
the mining companies, this space is a zone where a mineral is extracted to obtain an economic 
benefit outside or within Guatemala. Therefore, the rural and indigenous nature of the zones 
where there is a larger concentration of the projects configures an impact of environmental 
injustice in a country where the highest indices of development are located in urban zones 
(Aguilar-González, et al., 2015). 
From the perspective of human rights, a relevant trend that needs to be highlighted from the 
documented EDCs is the claim of the lack of free, prior and informed consultations (FPIC) that, by 
international law, redeem the rights of indigenous populations. This claim is accompanied by 
claims of scarce information available that local populations receive about the projects and their 
environmental, social and economic impacts. In response to this, as was discussed earlier and will 
be analyzed later, there have been community consultations organized by the communities 
themselves carried out on a national scale (Willems, 2009; Aguilar, et al., 2015).  
Another social impact that was consistently found is the creation of strong divisions in terms of 
support for or rejection of the mining projects in the communities involved. These divisions lead to 
social fragmentation, a rupture of community networks and, most of all, to direct confrontations 
that lead to casualties such as in the Escobal, Marlin & Fénix mining projects (Laplante & Nolin, 
2014; Aguilar-González, et al., 2015; UNDP, 2016). 
The criminalization of social protest was also identified as a social impact. Along the same lines, 
threats, murder attempts and murders of those who oppose mining projects. This type of impact is 
currently a constant in Latin America being reported by OCMAL, by means of a map of 
criminalization for the opposition to mining activities and by Global Witness in its reports of 
murdered environmentalists. OCMAl registers 141 cases of criminalization of social protest in Latin 
America since 2003. Of them, 9 are located in Guatemala which include shootings, aggressions and 
other actions against activists6. As we pointed above, Global Witness reported in 2016 that 2015 
was the year with the highest number of deaths of environmentalists in record with a total 185 
deaths worldwide of which 66% were in Latin America (122). Guatemala registered 10 deaths in 
different environmental conflicts. (Aguilar-González, et al., 2015; Global Witness, 2016). 
Another social impact documented in conflicts with greater intensity is the forced displacement by 
the State with the help of the Guatemalan army, police and companies´ security forces, leading to 
6 The OCMAL database and map can be found at https://mapa.conflictosmineros.net/ocmal_db-v2/
high indices of violence, violations of human rights and the emotional tranquility of the 
communities. In order to maintain order and pacify the confrontations, the government militarizes 
the territory (Aguilar-González, et al., 2015). 
Also the competition for territory includes vital elements like potable water. The pollution through 
chemicals and toxins like cyanide and mercury lead to the contamination of subterranean and 
superficial water sources. These generate health impacts and an unequal distribution of social risk 
and uncertainty. The surrounding communities of a mining project can show negative impacts in 
their public health in the long run, as can be seen in the cases of Marlin I in San Miguel Ixtahuacan 
(Shipton, 2017; Caxaj, et al., 2013; Caxaj, et al., 2014; Aguilar-González, et al., 2015; UNDP, 2016). 
3.4.3. Environmental Impacts 
The pollution of water, air, soil, deforestation, etc. were clearly identified environmental impacts 
that according to informants and the literature reviewed affect the project and surrounding 
territories. This information also identifies examples of how these negative impacts are 
cumulative. The deforestation for the construction of a mining project leads to the loss of 
biodiversity of flora and fauna, key elements to keep forming a policy of tourist attraction in 
Guatemala, which also would be reflected in the wellbeing of local actors and would have 
consequences in a whole economic sector of the country. The construction of roadways to bring in 
and take out machinery also interrupts ecological connectivity. These impacts are weaved with 
social ones also by way in which impacts such as the pollution of air for particular materials lead to 
health problems in community members. Additionally, the pollution of the soil in the mining 
project due to the use of chemicals affects not only the ecosystems but also the agricultural 
activities of its neighbors, causing a rupture of the local productive network (Castagnino, 2006; 
IARNA-URL, 2012; ICEFI, 2014; Maas, et al., 2014; Aguilar-González, et al., 2015; UNDP, 2016). 
3.5. Geographic Location of the Mining EDCs Studied 
Since 2010, IRALEP had highlighted metallic mining as having the highest amount of conflicts in the 
mining sector in Guatemala. Their analysis gathered data on municipalities showing conflicts 
related to mining at the time and compared it to the amount of metallic mining licenses (Table 6). 
They concluded that there was a high correlation between the number of licenses and mining 
conflicts (IRALEP, 2010). Their notion of conflict seems to be, in a similar fashion to other research 
institutes in Central America, more related to direct actions than to a conflict in the sense we use 
it here. Nevertheless, direct actions may be a reasonable indicator of conflicts.  Their data, even if 
almost a decade old, is the best at the time and allows to understand the correlation of 
conflictivity with the surge in licenses that our data represents in the post conflict period in 
Guatemala.
Table 5- Metallic Mining Licenses and Conflict per Municipality in 2010. Source: Adapted from 
Aguilar, et al. (2015) - Modified from IRALEP (2010).
Department Metallic Mining 
Licenses
Municipalities with metallic 
mining conflicts between 
Nov.2009-May 2010
Percentage of Municipalities 
Reporting Conflicts
Izabal 19 5 100
San Marcos 18 11 38
Huehuetenango 15 29 94
Alta Verapaz 15 10 63
Baja Verapaz 10 8 100
Juliapa 8 17 12
Zacapa 7 10 30
Guatemala 6 17 18
Chiquimula 6 11 55
El Progreso 6 8 38
Quiché 4 21 30
Quetzaltenango 4 24 13
Jalapa 4 7 71
Totonicapán 2 8 38
Santa Rosa 1 14 7
Chimaltenango 0 16 6
Total 125
As can be seen from placing the conflicts identified in this study on the map of mining rights 
presented in ICEFI (2014), the geographic distribution of the conflicts seems to be very influenced 
by the distribution of metallic mining licenses. The departments of San Marcos and 
Huehuetenango, with high indigenous populations, show a higher presence, somehow coinciding 
with the figures presented by IRALEP. The figures that IRALEP presents in Izabal may be 
interpreted as a reaction to a conflict of high intensity with a long history like that of El Estor. 
Figure 7- Mining EDCs Characterized and Geographic Distribution of Licenses. Source: Adapted from Aguilar, et al. (2015) based on Map 
in ICEFI (2014).
In our view this spatial coincidence confirms that the general substrate of social conflictivity that 
underlies the land and indigenous rights problem in Guatemala is intertwined with the mining 
conflicts as for us to use the notion of nested conflictivity which we proposed above.  The 
appropriation of environmental space may be overlapping with the lack of recognition of 
indigenous land rights and land concentration
3.6. Social actors and mining EDCs. 
We first summarize the results of our discourse analysis grouping the actors in three main sectors: 
the State (Central Government and Local Government), mining companies and their supporting 
social/political elites and international financial institutions and civil society. Figure 8 shows a 
summary of the 3 sectors of actors and their support and conflict relationships.
The “State” sector is complex as it includes many diverse actors, whose actions and discourses 
don’t necessarily agree. The perceptions of the different actor groups about it vary. The 
“insititutionality” of the State is considered by the private sector as weak. The fragility of its 
institutions leads to advances and setbacks when it comes to its extractive industry policy. For 
instance, in the view of this sector, on one side they try to provide incentives and try to protect 
the activity, yet they do not provide social services in the regions close to the mines, which 
contributes to social discontent. This generates uncertainty and instability when it comes to 
regulate the activities of the industries. Even though the State tends to establish a favorable 
climate for companies (which generate taxes, incomes, etc.), the mining companies claim from the 
State a more “clear” message (when it comes to successive moratoriums that are later lifted 
temporarilly, for example) and for clearer standards when it comes to evaluating the impacts of 
the activity. There is a consensus in the business sector about the necessity to have a rigorous 
technical framework, with standards better defined for matters such as environmental impact 
statements and institutions better prepared to evaluate them, for a new Mining Law (Orellana, 
2015).
Figure 8 – Sectors Related to Mining Conflicts in Guatemala. Source: Adapted from Aguilar, 
et al. (2015).
The representatives from the central government themselves recognize that public institutions fail 
in their role to address mining conflicts and that weak institutions don’t guarantee the fulfillment 
of the interest to cover the basic needs of the population. This discourse has evolved towards an 
awareness about the responsibility and the necessity of finding mechanisms of conflict resolution. 
In view of rising conflictivity in the last decade, the Ministry of Energy and Mines created a Vice-
ministry of Social Development which, in 2012, was granted the human resources to create a 
Dialogue Unit with trained personnel (Quiñonez, et al., 2015). We gathered from our own 
observation during the interview that the notions of conflictivity that were used, the actions that 
were taken and the resources that the Viceministry had were very basic. 
However, the reality of this discourse is very variable between public institutions and the interests 
at play. The Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, for example, does not show an active 
role in the resolution of the conflicts and does not respond to its obligation to protect the 
environment against the development of extractive activities.  Further, as a result of the collusion 
between public and private interests and in spite of certain advances such as the creation of public 
structures to handle conflict situations, the State often attempts to minimize the significance of 
protests and claims for a social and environmental justice. Similarly, it supports mining industries 
so that they may continue their activities (Maas, 2015; Molina, 2015). To delegitimize or 
criminalize protests, the central government tends to denounce “disinformation” by local actors, 
therefore attacking the credibility of social demands. Protestors are labeled as groups or 
organizations with “particular” interests and agendas that seek to influence citizens to generate 
opposition to mining projects. Equally, the State does not fully recognize the legitimacy of 
community consultations and seeks to regulate them. Even if they have been recognized as legally 
able to happen, they are yet to be legally binding (IRALEP, 2010; Oquelí, 2015; Rey Rosa, 2015).
With respect to the municipalities and decentralized public actors, their authority is characterized 
in many cases as symbolic. Many important decisions are still made by the central government. 
Municipalities do not promote local alternatives for development that would not be dependent on 
extractivism. In fact, they tend to favor CSR programs that substitute services like roads or other 
types of facilities that they are mandated to provide locally. In some exceptional cases 
municipalities have supported the communities and opposed mining, yet social actors claim that 
their opposition has been characterized as subversive (Maas, 2015; Molina, 2015; Rey Rosa, 2015).
When it comes to the mining sector, the ties between the mining activity and the model of 
development adopted after 1996 are important to understand actor perspectives about it. The 
promotion of extractive industries and the promotion of an economic development based on the 
extraction of natural resources are part of the process of free market promotion and neo-
extractivism that has characterized Guatemala´s strategy of growth (Maas, 2015; Molina, 2015). 
Governments as the one of Álvaro Arzú and Óscar Berger have claimed that mining activities have 
a strong positive impact in the economy of the country, generating economic and social 
development on a local as well as a national level. Studies by technical institutions such as ICEFI 
have shown that there is no evidence to substantiate this claim. (Molina, 2015) In the end, there is 
an antagonism between two visions of development represented by polarized actor groups: 
currently, there are a lot of movements that want to declare exclusive zones for indigenous 
populations and the presence of extractive industries do not fit in this model. This situation 
creates and contributes to the growing conflictivity (Maas, 2015; Molina, 2015).  
Even in the mining sector recognizes that conflictivity is rooted in the structural characteristics of 
the Guatemalan society which lead to social inequality, they also claim there is some degree of 
manipulation of public opinion focused on increasing the perception of conflictivity. They argue 
that conflicts are worsened by the intervention of external organizations (NGOs, national or 
international, community leaders, etc.), which have their own agenda and organize campaigns of 
misinformation in the communities. They discredit the opposition to mining, suggesting that it 
serves electoral interests, local government interests in some cases, and for the NGOs to stay 
active receiving financial help from external sources (Monroy, et al., 2017). 
Understanding power relations between public and private business actors is fundamental to 
understand the reasons for decisions on the management of national assets and political 
decisions. Social actors perceive business organizations and political/oligarchic elites as having a 
disproportionate amount of influence. Multilateral financial organisms such as the World Bank 
(WB), the Inter-American Bank of Development (IBD) are also important actors in creating political 
pressure to governments to support these kinds of businesses. Thus a series of power connections 
between international financial interests and local hegemonic groups are perceived at the root of 
social and institutional decisions in favor of mining projects (Maas, 2015; Molina, 2015). 
Mining companies claim to have taken actions to try to reduce these conflicts and the resulting 
opposition. For the companies, the conflicts cause significant economic losses. For this, they 
assure that mining actors promote transparency practices from the industry. They consider that 
conflicts originate from insufficient information about the positive impacts and the benefits of 
mining activities (Marroquín, 2015; Monroy, et al., 2017; Orellana, 2015).  
Additionally, mining companies state that they have developed CSR programs and strategies to 
face conflicts. Through these programs, the companies hope to improve the wellbeing in areas 
that are not directly involved in mining activities, with actions such as the financing of education, 
agroforestry projects, health and occupational training programs. This strategy is based on what 
they call a win-win vision: sustainable production and keeping social stability  (Marroquín, 2015; 
Monroy, et al., 2017; Orellana, 2015). Companies have been strengthening their discourse and 
perfecting their strategies, adapting to each context. They seek the support of the communities, 
which legitimizes their presence in the project areas, generating empathy and presenting the 
industry as a fellow community member (Waxenecker, 2013). 
As pointed before, a perceived negative consequence of this strategy is that it generates a sort of 
“privatization” of basic services, in the sense that the Company can define which the most 
important needs for the community are. Requests and claims go directly to the company, without 
passing by local public authorities as are the municipality or community councils. For that matter, 
there is a claim for a mayor intervention and clarity on behalf of the State, through Environmental 
Impact Studies and the regulation of the application of Convention 169 for the community 
consultations on the desirability of the projects. Opponents perceive that, situations of conflict 
occur in zones largely abandoned by the State for a long time, and the majority of demands on 
behalf of the population originate, apart from demands for economic opportunities, in deficiencies 
of State institutions (Maas, 2015; Molina, 2015). 
The civil society sector is a mosaic of actors and organizations that do not necessarily have the 
same interests, nor do they act in the same territorial scale. They include the inhabitants of zones 
where mining projects are being developed and are those most affected. With their support, 
protest efforts have been organized to act in a coordinated way in the public sphere. Community 
organizations (including indigenous authorities) and national and international organizations come 
together into play  (Maas, 2015; Molina, 2015).  The sector has integrated into networks of 
solidarity that conform the regional opposition to the consequences of neoliberalism and, more 
specifically, neo-extractivism in Latin America (Holden & Jacobson, 2008). The strategy of 
community mining consultations has come to be understood as a regional process diffused and 
transformed through anti-mining networks (Walter & Urkidi, 2017). These networks have grown to 
be part of what is known as a global environmental justice movement (Martinez-Alier, et al., 
2016).
On another set of interests, oligarchic social sectors usually support the position of private 
business and the status quo. The Catholic Church and other religious organizations frequently 
support the interests of community groups, NGOs, etc. Yet some conservative sectors support the 
interests of oligarchs  (Maas, 2015; Molina, 2015).
There is palpable concern among communities as well as civil society organizations relative to the 
negative impacts of this activity, a reaction to being the most immediate and disproportionate 
consequences of pollution to the environment, health risks, negative consequences for 
agriculture, restrictions to the access of ancestral land within indigenous territories, the imminent 
threat of the presence of security forces on mining sites, etc. The general perceived opinion 
among this sector holds that mining does not bring development or a positive impact to the 
communities. They argue that the benefits that mining yields do not compensate for the long-term 
damages that it causes. They demand means of mitigation to prevent derived environmental and 
social problems (Oquelí, 2015; Rey Rosa, 2015). 
A heterogeneous sector that does not directly participate in the conflicts, yet supports actor 
groups playing many times a decisive role, includes academic institutions or research 
organizations. National and International media are also perceived as a key component of this 
group.  The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and political parties are recognized in 
this sector too (Maas, 2015; Rey Rosa, 2015).
According to a survey published in Prensa Libre in 2014, 64% of a sample of Guatemalan society in 
the age range between 18 and 35 expressed to have an unfavorable view of mining projects 
(Álvarez, 2014). In general, the lack of information, of dialogue and of previous consultation before 
these projects begin is criticized. The perception is that neither are mining companies nor the 
government being transparent with respect to possible negative impacts. To denounce the 
criminalization of protest, many civil society actors highlight that conflicts are is positive in the 
sense that they promote an awakening of collective consciousness, strengthening social cohesion 
and promoting alternative solutions (Maas, 2015; Molina, 2015; Oquelí, 2015; Rey Rosa, 2015). 
These sectors of civil society also condemn the role of a State that has been a promoter of 
extractive industries and not a regulator, by favoring and promoting the interests of this business 
sector (national and trasnational companies), through the creation and adoption of laws. The State 
places extractive industries in the center of its vision of development, dismissing the notions of 
value of indigenous peoples, and the demands of these groups in civil society, marginalizing 
communities from the consultation rights and decision making processes about the exploitation of 
the natural resources in their own territories (Oquelí, 2015; Rey Rosa, 2015).   
This mapping of actor interests and perceptions ratifies the idea of nested EDC.  Beyond, it is 
important to understand the dynamics of these actor interactions through time to complete the 
framework of understanding of the EDC phenomena. 
As stated above, a series of case studies of conflict action-response timelines were built for three 
of the identified conflicts: Fenix-El Estor, Marlin I and San Rafael, all high intensity metal mining 
conflicts. We chose as a sample for this paper, to present the case of Fénix-El Estor in Figure 9.
The figure represents the dynamic of pro and anti-mining actors through time in the period of 
interest. The amount and diversity of actions involved in these EDCs illustrates their complexity 
and their increase in intensity. The upper axis illustrates violent actions involved including deaths 
and human rights violations.
These conflicts interact with one another around 2005, when among the anti-mining actions of 
organized civil society and others the creation of the FNRM (National Front of Resistance to 
Mining) is created. After this, the overlapping direct actions/protests against mining become a 
national reality in Guatemala. Illustrating this phenomena graphically, one could speak of swarms 
Figure 9- Action-Response Timeline of the Fénix-El Estor Mining EDC. Source: Adapted from Aguilar, et 
al. (2015)
or spirals of mining EDC through time (Figure 10). This swarming has been definitely influenced by 
community consultations, led by multi-scalar social movements and local governments, becoming 
a contested emergent institution for participation (Walter & Urkidi, 2017).
Figure 10- A Swarm or Spiral of Mining Conflicts Illustrated by the Overlap of Actions 
through Time after the Creation of the National Front against Mining in Guatemala. Source: 
Adapted from Aguilar et al. (2015)
These swarms or spiral of EDCs, characterized previously as a nested and complex within the 
Guatemalan substrate of socio-ecological injustice, confirm that the appropriate approach to 
address the problem of mining goes beyond managing individual conflicts. The escalation in the 
actions of the different actors that participate in them and their evolution through time, with 
potential multiplying effects, requires the development of appropriate social institutions to 
handle them. 
3.7. The legal and institutional framework relative to mining and the role of the State in its 
implementation 
Presently in Guatemala the legal regime of mining is formed by two main instruments. First, the 
Political Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala, in particular Article 125 which declares mining 
exploitation as an activity of public utility and necessity. Article 121 declares the property of the 
State in mining fields, therefore setting the framework for licenses or concessions to be needed in 
order to undertake this activity. 
The second body is the Law of Mining, Decree 48-97 of the Congress of the Republic and its Rules 
of Procedure (Government Agreement 176-2001), reformed in a context of privatization and 
commercial liberalization. It establishes reconnaissance licenses, previous to the exploration 
phase. It also declares Areas of Mining Interest. Royalties for the State and Municipalities were 
reduced (from 6% to 1%) and terms to resolve applications for licenses are reduced substantially 
(ICEFI, 2014; UNDP, 2016). 
Additionally, the reform allowed foreign companies to acquire the total property of mining 
companies, being exempted, at the same time, from several tax payments. This leads to 
Guatemala´s royalties and taxes being amongst the lowest in Latin America and the world (IRALEP, 
2010). 
However, in 2012, an agreement was signed between the Government of the Republic and the 
Chamber of Industry in Guatemala. This Agreement on the Implementation Framework of 
Voluntary Royalties Derived from Mining Activities in the Country, allows for companies to pay 
voluntary royalties, between 2% and 4% (plus the mandatory 1%). With this agreement, royalties 
for the mining activity of non-precious metals increased from 1% to 3%, while precious metals 
(gold and silver) were increased to 4% (Molina, 2015). 
Municipalities receive between 1.5% and 1.8% of these royalties, while the larger part goes to the 
common fund of the Central Government, in which there are no specific designations. Against this 
situation, there has been a discussion on the possibility of increasing mining royalties, which would 
mean modifying voluntary royalties and changes in the Mining Law. However, there has been no 
consensus reached so far (Molina, 2015).    
The legal reform of 1997 is perceived as having facilitated and accelerated the concessions of 
licenses for the exploitation and exploration of metallic and non-metallic mining. Legal weaknesses 
(in environmental and fiscal matters) to develop mining activities have served as a perverse 
incentive aside this legislation to increase the social and environmental impacts of the activity. 
Since 2008 several moratoriums have been declared on the granting of new mining concessions, 
while there have been discussions on a New Mining Law within Congress. 
The Mining Law does not require that the indigenous people be consulted before the approval of 
exploration or exploitation licenses for mining projects.  As said above, the rising opposition to 
mining activities and the protests against the lack of previous and informed consultation, has led 
to civil society organized community consultations to express their opinion (opposition) with 
respect to mining in their territories. Civil society organizations claim that these consultations have 
their legal support in ILO´s Convention 169, ratified by Guatemala in 1996. By means of executive 
decree 9-96, it was transformed into a new internal legal norm. Also, Guatemala voted in favor of 
the adoption by the General Assembly of the United Nations of the Declaration of Rights of 
Indigenous Populations. However, there are no existing mechanisms in the current national 
legislation to guarantee the participation of the communities and the effective implementation of 
Convention 169 in mining activities and others. Therefore, especially the indigenous communities 
have developed their own processes to express their position about the projects that affect them. 
These are known as “community consultations of good faith”, using the established methodology 
in the Municipal Code (Laplante & Nolin, 2014; Maas, 2015; Walter & Urkidi, 2017). 
These consultations are labeled as controversial and discredited by the State, local public actors 
and mining companies, because of their methodologies as well as the validity of their decisions 
(Orellana, 2015). Yet, rulings have determined that they are indeed legal.
4. Conclusion: Where to go? Institutional Reform and Mining Conflicts in Guatemala
The Human Development Report from Guatemala (2015-2016) adopted a very suggestive name: 
“Beyond Conflict, Struggles for Wellbeing”. In it, it focuses on the inequitable structural conditions 
of the Guatemalan reality, the historical process of the Peace Accords of the late XX Century, the 
potential of the country for human development, the lessons learned from social conflicts, land 
rights and distribution, mining conflicts, hydroelectric energy generation conflicts and the 
challenges of a democracy in construction (UNDP, 2016).
When we interviewed key academic/activist informants on the possibility of mining projects that 
would not generate conflicts, they reduced this possibility to 4 scenarios:
1. Mining projects are very low scale, have no surrounding population or their impacts are not 
known/have not been studied (Sastre I was presented as a case in point);
2. There are projects but no organized civil society that would oppose, resist and develop 
collective actions that generate conflicts of diverse intensities;
3. Civil society is coopted and cannot oppose or organize a resistance;
4. The royalties are high since the first phase of exploration. This eases the will of communities 
from before and allows the establishment of power enclaves over the territory. 
One of the most striking trends in these scenarios is that the informants never consider the role of 
the law or the institutions of the State, which they see as irrelevant due to their ineffectiveness. 
Obviously the intensity of the conflicts which involves deaths and human rights violations 
contributes greatly to the sense of distrust.
Significant structural changes are obviously needed in Guatemala in order for the country to be 
sustainable and fair. Beyond this, it is obvious that due to its history and impacts that open pit 
metallic mining is not a desirable activity for countries which seek sustainability and fairness. If, as 
is the perception of several social actors and has been a historical constant, the State is a 
supporter of this activity in Guatemala, the civil society and NGOs which organize to oppose it will 
have to continue expecting structural change to come as a result of swarms of conflicts. Human 
rights violations need to be stopped. 
The depth of the conditions that place Guatemala at the top of registered conflicts in the Central 
American region makes it impossible for CSR programs to be able to buffer the effects of the 
prevailing situation. A shift in the power relations that control the State would be necessary to be 
able to implement the institutional changes that may lead to less confrontation due to the 
productive activities that characterize its model of development.
Those changes should include, but not be limited to, full implementation of Principle 10 of the Rio 
Convention meaning that the population needs to receive full access to information, participation 
in environmental governance decisions and full procedural rights in order to exercise the right to a 
healthy and clean environment. This is seen as an essential step in readiness to address global 
environmental problems today (particularly climate change) even by environmental outfits seen in 
the past as distant from participatory governance ideas such as USAID (ECOEDIT, 2016). 
In fact, the conflictive environment centered on mining is exacerbated by the lack of rigorous 
environmental legislation. This generates social protest and discontent over the way in which 
extractive industry activities develop in Guatemala. 
Therefore, one of the fundamental conditions that is seen as necessary is to guarantee an 
adequate participatory environmental governance. It would serve as a framework for a fair 
distribution of the costs and benefits of the use of environmental space. Small weak offices 
specialized in documenting conflicts and a few public officers using alternative conflict resolution 
techniques will not suffice. An increase in the effectiveness and the social credibility in control, 
vigilance and adequate sustainable management mechanisms by those institutions in charge is 
essential. This includes increased resources for municipalities, protected area systems and the 
ministries in charge.
Finally, in visualizing the structural changes needed to establish a political and economic system 
that is socially, culturally and environmentally fair in Guatemala, a wider set of deep and 
important questions need to be asked and answered. These include what are the desirable 
features for a political and socio-economic system that can support environmental justice. Seeking 
to answer such questions goes beyond the bounds of this paper. Yet, it is good to know that the 
latest Human Development Report of the UNDP has sought to address them. The reader is invited 
to expand on this matter in this publication.
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